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INTRODUCTION
As statutory schemes go, the patent statute has been relatively sta-
ble from 1952 to the present.  In contrast to copyright law, where 
Congress has taken a close—indeed at times intense—interest in the 
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details of the statutory scheme,1 legislative intervention into the patent 
statute, when it has occurred, has been more limited and narrower in 
scope.2  For many reasons, however, patent law has been disequilibrat-
ing over time, and calls for patent reform have been increasing in in-
tensity.  One of the many factors contributing to this disequilibration 
in recent years has been the ongoing emergence of the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) as a more robust institutional player ac-
tively seeking to influence patent policy.  The more prominent role 
played by the PTO is both a cause and an effect of dissatisfaction with 
the state of patent law. 
In order to better understand some of the forces behind the 
moves toward patent reform, we should examine not just who is de-
manding legal change, but which institutions are able and willing to 
supply legal rules and norms.  Since 1952, Congress has left much of 
the market for supply-side influence in patent law to the federal courts 
and, to a lesser degree, to the PTO.  In 1982, Congress consolidated 
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases in one court, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Since then, lacking institutional 
competition from other courts, the Federal Circuit has strengthened 
patent law.  In the process, the court has made this a more attractive 
area for institutions to wield legal and policy influence. 
This development has not been lost on the PTO.  For a while now, 
the PTO has been vying to gain more influence in the market for sup-
plying legal rules and norms.  The PTO is on both the demand side 
and the supply side in patent law evolution, functioning as a de-
mander of some changes to patent policy and as a supplier of others.3
In the process, it has appealed to the inventive community for support. 
In this Article, I examine some of the ways in which the PTO has 
maneuvered since the early 1990s to occupy a more central position in 
1 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, secs. 103, 202, 
112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76, 2877-86 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 
1201–1205 (2006)) (creating safe harbors for service providers and prescribing civil 
and criminal remedies for the circumvention of copyright protection systems); Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (extending the term of copyright 
protection). 
2 See, e.g., Patent and Trademark Office Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 
Stat. 1501A-572 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (reor-
ganizing the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office). 
3 For example, the PTO is a demander of change in the form of more deference 
to its decisions and a (potential) supplier of change through revision and reformation 
of its examiner productivity metric. 
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making patent law and policy.  I tell a slightly different story from the 
one often told, in which regulatory agencies are passive targets of at-
tempts at capture by their constituencies.  Whereas the literature on 
the origin of attempts to influence the regulatory process focuses 
mostly on the demand side, in this Article I focus on the supply side.4
One of the weaknesses of the capture theory as it is often presented is 
that it assumes that only the regulated constituency takes the initiative.  
This implies that interest groups are the instigators of attempts at 
regulatory entanglement, an assumption that is questionable in the 
case of the PTO.  I argue that while we often think of agency entan-
glement with the community it is supposed to regulate as an unalloyed 
bad, there have been some positive results from the PTO’s attempts to 
increase its influence.  Whether this state of affairs will continue, how-
ever, remains to be seen. 
In Part I of this Article, I argue that the supply side of patent law 
has long been dominated if not monopolized by the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.  With patent law having increased in impor-
tance in the past few decades, the PTO, facing few competitors in the 
patent policymaking field, has had an incentive to emerge as a 
stronger player in the market for legal influence over patent law by 
increasing its own influence.  In Part II, I describe two major types of 
moves in which the PTO has engaged, and continues to engage, in 
order to accomplish this.  One set of moves has given the PTO slightly 
more legal power.  The results are more important for their symbolic 
value than for influencing legal outcomes.  The other maneuver by 
the PTO is more subtle but more substantively important:  appeals for 
support by the PTO to the constituency—inventors—with which it is 
supposed to have an adversarial relationship.  (I do not maintain, 
however, that the PTO has been captured by the inventive commu-
nity.)  The resulting benefits to the PTO—such as a larger budget, 
new facilities, and more control over its finances—have been measur-
able.  In Part III of this Article, I argue that so far, the PTO’s attempts 
to increase its influence have had some social benefits.  PTO attempts 
to appeal to the inventive community have resulted in greater institu-
tional transparency and more rigorous debate about the faults and 
flaws of the patent system.  At the same time, expanding the PTO’s 
4 See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making:  
A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089, 1090 (1991) (criticizing earlier stud-
ies of regulatory decision making for failing to consider the relationships between 
members of the supply and demand sides). 
1968 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1965
power presents dangers.  In the long run, it is unclear whether the 
benefits will outweigh the costs. 
There are a few caveats:  First, let me emphasize once again that 
I’m not saying the PTO has been captured.  Certainly the PTO has in 
recent years displayed a sensitivity to the views of the inventive com-
munity that it previously lacked, and it has attempted to enlist the in-
ventive community in its efforts to expand its influence and budget, 
but this is not the same as saying that the PTO has become controlled 
by the inventive community.5  Second, I’m being deliberately reduc-
tionist in this Article.  I’m not trying to set out all the subtleties of the 
complex institution that is the PTO.  Rather, I’m seeking to capture 
some essential features of the PTO’s relative positioning throughout 
the past two decades, and to distill some key moves that the PTO has 
made in order to illustrate how it has maneuvered itself.  Doing that 
means I’m deliberately excluding other forces that have shaped the 
fortunes of the PTO.  In addition, throughout this Article my intent is 
not to take a normative position on the legal or budgetary issues on 
which the PTO has taken an advocacy position.  Rather, it is to argue 
that each of these events has resulted in the PTO having more influ-
ence and more wherewithal to increase its influence. 
I. PATENT LAW’S SUPPLY SIDE
Courts are the primary locus of the evolution of patent law.  Since 
1952, Congress has not taken much interest in amending the patent 
code, leaving the bulk of legal evolution to the courts.  Starting in 
1982, that meant delegating the evolution of patent law to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Congress’s lack of interest 
has been longstanding; it was relatively indifferent even before the 
creation of the Federal Circuit.  On the few occasions that significant 
amendments to the patent statute have been successful, they have of-
ten pertained to procedural or administrative matters—such as better 
funding for the PTO—on which all participants agree.6
5 Nor is the PTO truly a regulatory agency in the sense that, for instance, the Food 
and Drug Administration is a regulatory agency.  See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Pat-
ent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 129-30 (2000) (arguing 
that the PTO’s relationship is more contractual than regulatory). 
6 See, e.g., American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-113, 
sec. 4502, § 122(b)(1), 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-561 (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 122(b)(1) (2006)) (authorizing public disclosure of certain patent applications). 
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Why hasn’t Congress taken a closer interest in patent law?  The 
broad standards that comprise most of the patent code indicate that 
Congress has delegated patent policy to the courts, particularly to the 
Federal Circuit, but whether this is a cause or an effect of Congress’s 
indifference—or indeed if there is any causal link—remains unclear.  
Given that Congress outsourced the writing of the 1952 Patent Act 
and passed it without floor debate,7 it’s not clear that any legislative 
intent can be attributed to members of Congress regarding the Act.8
Recent criticism of the Federal Circuit (much of it vituperative) com-
ing from the patent community may tempt us to forget that wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the court is a new phenomenon.9  From the 
time of its creation until relatively recently, commentators generally 
believed the Federal Circuit was doing a good job in its various subject 
areas.10  Congress may have felt no great need to intervene in an area 
it perceived as complex and technical.  Probably all of these reasons 
play a part to varying degrees in explaining Congress’s reticence to 
pass new patent legislation. 
If Congress hasn’t been an institution active in patent law, then 
who has?  Not the Supreme Court.  It doesn’t enter the lists often 
enough, even in recent years, to have a wide impact on the field.  
Since its creation in 1982,11 the Federal Circuit has been the main lo-
cus of patent law evolution.  When it was created, the Federal Circuit 
was tasked with bringing consistency to patent law.  Many commenta-
7 As Judge Giles S. Rich, one of the authors of the 1952 Patent Act, explained, 
“The New Patent Act went through both houses on consent calendars, and those 
houses relied on the unanimous recommendations of their respective committees.”  
Neil A. Smith, Remembrances and Memorial:  Judge Giles Sutherland Rich 1904–1999, 82 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 597, 601 (2000). 
8 Giles S. Rich and P.J. Federico were the two main drafters of the 1952 Patent Act.  
Judge Rich asserted that “[l]egislative intent was supplied later . . . in the form of the 
Reviser’s Notes.”  Id.; see also P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 
1, 6-9 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 166-70 (1993) 
(reviewing the evolution of the bill and the lack of significant congressional scrutiny). 
9 See, e.g., Charles W. Shifley et al., Is Federal Circuit Obviousness Law “Gobbledygook” 
and “Irrational”?  Why Justice Scalia Says So, and What May Come of That, INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J., May 2007, at 5, 7-8 (stating that “the Federal Circuit is arguably at an all-
time low in terms of reputation among all judges, professors, and commentators since 
its creation in 1982”). 
10 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:  A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 74 (1989) (“On the whole, the CAFC experiment has 
worked well for patent law . . . .”). 
11 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, secs. 101–102, 
96 Stat. 25, 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44 (2006)) (establishing a Federal Court of 
Appeals and a Federal Claims Court).  The jurisdiction of the court is set out in 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a). 
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tors would argue that it has accomplished this task well, although most 
would also say that it has become a pro-patent court (although that 
depends to some degree on one’s baseline).  Adam Jaffe and Josh 
Lerner, for instance, show that the Federal Circuit has been more 
likely to find patents valid and infringed than did the appellate courts 
before 1982.12  While this does demonstrate that expectation baselines 
about the enforceability of patents have changed, without more, it 
doesn’t prove that the Federal Circuit has been captured.  For one 
thing, we need to know whether the validity determinations made by 
appellate courts before the Federal Circuit were accurate.  Perhaps 
courts were previously too quick to invalidate patents. 
Two stories could be told about the Federal Circuit making pat-
ents more enforceable.  One is a public interest story.  On this view, 
patent enforcement had become too weak, and declaring more pat-
ents valid increased social welfare.  It has long been known that patent 
cases are unpopular with many members of the judiciary.  Prior to the 
creation of the Federal Circuit, the fastest way a district court judge 
could make a patent case go away for good was to declare the patent 
invalid.  By midcentury, antipatent sentiment ran so high that Justice 
Jackson famously lamented that the Supreme Court had developed 
such a “strong passion” for striking down patents that the only valid 
patents left were ones the “Court ha[d] not been able to get its hands 
on.”13  And as Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner note of Sakraida v. AG Pro, 
Inc.,14 one of the few patent cases in the latter half of the twentieth 
century in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
Who would get the duty of writing the opinion for this “cow shit case” 
was a matter of considerable controversy—ultimately, it was assigned to 
Justice William Brennan because he had antagonized the Chief Justice 
with his acrid dissents in other cases.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the deci-
sion that resulted in this case was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court’s own earlier rulings.
15
Even today, patent cases are generally unpopular with district 
court judges, many of whom continue to express dislike of patents and 
12 See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW 
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT 98-107 (2004) (noting trends in the Federal Circuit toward strength-
ening patent holders’ rights). 
13 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
14 425 U.S. 273 (1976).  In this case the Court found the patent obvious and there-
fore invalid.  Id. at 282-83. 
15 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 12, at 100 (footnote omitted). 
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dismay about having patent cases on their dockets.16  As some com-
mentators have noted, before the Federal Circuit was created it was 
difficult to imagine how patents could have become much weaker.17
On this view, hostility to patents among the judiciary was so great that 
the Federal Circuit’s strengthening of patent law was a necessary and 
efficiency-enhancing corrective measure.18
But of course a pessimistic story could be told as well:  that of judi-
cial self-aggrandizement.  Judges in specialized courts may come to 
identify a little too closely with the areas of law in which they special-
ize.19  Enforcement of patents increases the importance and impact of 
patent law, and we can expect judges to prefer that their cases be per-
ceived as important rather than mundane or marginal.  On this view, 
the Federal Circuit has focused on benefiting patent interests even 
though the costs more broadly imposed on society may outweigh 
those benefits.  Both the public interest story and the self-interest story 
have explanatory power when applied to the Federal Circuit; neither 
is mutually exclusive. 
In either case, by making patents stronger and making patent law 
more economically important, the Federal Circuit has expanded the 
market for supply-side institutions in patent law, thus creating incen-
tives for the PTO to try to gain some market share.  Although the 
Federal Circuit has been the major force affecting the shape of patent 
law, over the past decade it has started to receive some competition.  
So far, this competition has come neither from Congress nor in a se-
rious way from the Supreme Court, even though the Supreme Court 
recently has been granting certiorari on more patent cases than in 
previous years.20  Rather, the competition has come from an executive 
16 See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing Proceedings at 19, O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No. 
95-0113 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1995) (quoting Judge Kent saying of patent cases, “You 
know, it’s hard to deal with [these] things”). 
17 See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 12, at 97 (“[T]he ‘pro-patent’ policy 
changes of the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as the inevitable, perhaps even desirable, 
historical ‘backswing’ after a long period of weakening patents.”). 
18 I do not take a position on what the optimal level of patent protection is, but I 
do agree with most scholars and industry analysts that patent protection was badly frac-
tured prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit.  See Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 74 
(stating that patent law is more uniform and better suited for national interests today). 
19 See generally Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 
1984?  An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
761 (1983) (arguing that the caseload crisis in the federal courts of appeals has led to 
delegation and specialization of courts and interests). 
20 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008); KSR Int’l Co. 
v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 
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branch institution, the PTO.  Since approximately 1993, the PTO has 
been maneuvering to become more powerful. 
The PTO has maneuvered not only to bolster its reputation and 
material position, but also to increase its power in the world of patent 
law and policy.  Initially the PTO focused on international patent law, 
where it had little competition from other state institutions, but then 
it began to seek power closer to home and sought to increase its 
power relative to the Federal Circuit.  The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Dickinson v. Zurko, which brought the PTO’s factual findings under 
the ambit of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), was a step in 
this direction and a significant symbolic victory in the eyes of the 
PTO.21  Since then, the PTO has boasted of its role in advising the So-
licitor General’s Office as to whether the Supreme Court should grant 
certiorari on patent cases coming out of the Federal Circuit, announc-
ing when the Supreme Court’s decision to grant or deny certiorari 
matches up with the advice that the PTO has given the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s Office.22
II. THE PTO’S ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE
What elements have contributed to the PTO’s relative position-
ing?  In this Part, I discuss a few moves the PTO has made that have 
influenced its relative institutional positioning.  These moves fall into 
two categories:  first, attempts to gain more legal power, both over its 
own internal matters and in administrative appeals of patent matters 
before the Federal Circuit; and second, petitions to the inventive 
community and Congress for a larger budget and other resources, 
more control over its finances, and a new physical plant.  When suc-
cessful, these moves have increased the PTO’s power and allowed it to 
gain a larger market share, if you will, of patent law and policy deci-
sion making.  I focus only on moves that are endogenous to the PTO.  
Other factors, such as the importance of technological innovation and 
(2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercEx-
change, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).  But see Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted). 
21 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).  The petitioner was Q. Todd Dickinson, the PTO Di-
rector at the time. 
22 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 50 [hereinafter 2007 REPORT]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 47-48; U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FIS-
CAL YEAR 2005, at 48-49 [hereinafter 2005 REPORT].
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the strength of the economy, have no doubt contributed in some way 
to the relative position of the PTO in recent years, but these issues are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
Notably, the PTO’s desire to increase its legal influence and to 
appeal to the inventive community has been confined to the patent 
side of the agency.  As the PTO itself has said, “The Patent Business is 
one of the PTO’s three core businesses.  The primary mission of the 
Patent Business is to help customers get patents.”23  By contrast, the 
trademark side of the PTO is less ambitious:  “The primary mission of 
the Trademark Business is to apply the provisions of the Trademark 
Act of 1946 in the examination and registration of trademarks. . . . 
The core process of the Trademark Business is the examination of an 
application for trademark registration.”24  Although in recent years the 
PTO has become more subtle in its language, the description of the 
business of the patent side of the PTO as “help[ing] customers get 
patents” is clearly an appeal to the group with which the PTO is sup-
posed to have an adversarial relationship. 
A.  Legal Influence 
The PTO has made several attempts to increase its influence over 
patent law in the past decade.  The first of these occurred in 1999 with 
the passage of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), which 
reorganized the PTO and established it as an executive branch agency 
instead of just a subunit of the Department of Commerce.25  The sec-
ond attempt concluded that same year in Dickinson v. Zurko, in which 
the PTO won the right to have APA standards of review applied to its 
factual conclusions when patent applicants appeal directly to the Fed-
eral Circuit.26  The third is an ongoing battle, and the logical out-
growth of Zurko:  determining the proper scope of the PTO’s rule-
making authority.27  I take no position in this Article on the merits of 
any of these moves on the part of the PTO.  Instead, I merely point 
23 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CORPORATE PLAN—2001, at 23, http:// 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/corpplan/index.htm. 
24 Id. at 42. 
25 See AIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-113, secs. 4711–4712, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-572 
to -575 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006)). 
26 Zurko, 527 U.S. at 154-55. 
27 See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the PTO does not 
have substantive rulemaking authority, finding that the PTO-proposed rules at issue in 
the case were procedural, and remanding to the district court for further proceedings). 
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out that all of these moves have increased, at least to some degree, the 
PTO’s power as a supplier of legal rules and patent policies. 
1.  The AIPA and Executive Branch Agency Status 
The Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform 
Act of 1999, of which the AIPA was a part, expanded the top ranks of 
the PTO and gave the entity more control over its operations.28  It re-
organized the way the PTO was structured and made it an executive 
branch agency within the Department of Commerce.29  The AIPA ele-
vated the position of head of the PTO from Commissioner to Director 
(also an Under Secretary of Commerce), who is required to have “a 
professional background and experience in patent or trademark 
law.”30  The AIPA also expanded the top ranks of the PTO to include 
two commissioners appointed by the Director—a Commissioner of 
Patents and a Commissioner of Trademarks—and, upon nomination 
by the Director, a Deputy Director.31  The PTO reports to the Secre-
tary of Commerce for policy direction, but the PTO’s executive 
branch agency status gives it control over its budget allocations and 
other administrative management functions.  The AIPA also created 
the Patent Public Advisory Committee and the Trademark Public Ad-
visory Committee to advise the Director on PTO policies, goals, per-
formance, budget matters, and user fees.32
These changes noticeably benefited the PTO.  Restructuring the 
PTO as an executive branch agency was the first step toward giving the 
PTO more power and self-governance.  It was also an important step 
toward giving the PTO control over its budget, and budget control is a 
source of power for bureaucrats.  The existence of the Advisory Com-
mittees at least allowed the PTO to create the appearance that it was 
willing to accept feedback and input from the regulated community, 
while ensuring that the PTO wasn’t legally bound by the committees’ 
recommendations.  At the time, the inventive community supported 
these changes before Congress.  As the American Intellectual Property 
Law Association (AIPLA), a bar association representing intellectual 
28 See AIPA secs. 4711–4713, 113 Stat. at 1501A-572 to -578. 
29 Id. sec. 4711.  Prior to the passage of the AIPA, the head of the PTO was a Com-
missioner appointed by the President.  35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1994). 
30 AIPA sec. 4713, § 3(a)(1), 113 Stat. at 1501A-575 to -578 (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1) (2006)). 
31 Id. sec. 4713, § 3(b)(1)–(2), 113 Stat. at 1501A-576 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 3(b)(1)–(2)). 
32 Id. sec. 4714, 113 Stat. at 1501A-578 to -580 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 5). 
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property lawyers, asserted, “[T]he PTO could function more effi-
ciently and effectively, and provide users with higher-quality and more 
responsive products and services if it were properly transformed into a 
government corporation.”33  Since then, however, some commentators 
in the inventive community have become more critical of the results.  
For example, some commentators have argued that the Patent Public 
Advisory Committee is toothless and “has never effectively asserted any 
real oversight of PTO operations,” or is even being undermined by 
the PTO itself because it has been “provided with no real support to 
investigate and challenge.”34
2.  Judicial Deference 
In addition to getting more autonomy from executive branch 
oversight, the PTO has also been trying to get more deferential review 
of its decisions from the Federal Circuit.  The more deferential the re-
view, the broader the range of PTO action that would survive a legal 
challenge.  Historically, the PTO’s decisions did not receive much 
deference before a reviewing court.35  For decades, reviewing courts 
applied neither the deferential standards of review of the APA36 nor 
those of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.37 to 
the PTO, choosing instead to apply older and more rigorous stan-
dards of review.38
33 Patent Law Changes:  Hearing on H.R. 400 and H.R. 811 Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Gov’t Programs and Oversight of the Comm. of Small Bus., 105th Cong. 167 (1997) (statement 
of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association). 
34 Posting of Greg Aharonian to Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), Patent Public Advi-
sory Committee (PPAC), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/08/patent-public-a.html 
(Aug. 17, 2007). 
35 The PTO has long had regulatory authority to enact rules that govern its inter-
nal proceedings.  See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A). 
36 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (mandating that courts reviewing agency action set 
aside such actions if they are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or . . . unsupported by substantial evidence”). 
37 See 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (stating that courts must defer to an administra-
tive agency’s interpretation of a statute so long as the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable”). 
38 The Federal Circuit has often rejected the application of APA standards to re-
view of PTO findings of fact.  See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
banc) (applying the “clearly erroneous” standard of review), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. 
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (re-
fusing to modify the “clearly erroneous” standard of review); In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 
614 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (using a more stringent standard of review than that of the APA); 
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (refusing to address the issue of 
standard of review because it was not perceived as central to the case).  The Federal Cir-
cuit has also declined to apply Chevron to the PTO’s interpretations of law.  See Merck & 
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This was no great surprise, even if some commentators considered 
it a bit of a puzzle that reviewing courts declined to apply APA stan-
dards of review to the PTO.39  Early drafts of the APA explicitly ex-
empted the PTO from the APA’s purview.40  From the passage of the 
APA until the end of the twentieth century, as the Supreme Court 
noted, “both the patent bench and the patent bar had concluded that 
the stricter ‘clearly erroneous’ standard was . . . a requirement placed 
upon the PTO,” and “even the PTO acquiesced in this interpretation 
for almost 50 years after the enactment of the APA.”41
By getting a more deferential standard of review applied to its fac-
tual and legal findings, however, the PTO would have a better chance 
of making its decisions stick.  In Dickinson v. Zurko, the PTO saw a 
chance to raise the level of deference that it received from the Federal 
Circuit from the traditional “clearly erroneous” standard of review42 to 
the APA’s marginally more deferential “substantial evidence” or “arbi-
trary and capricious” standard.43
Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reviewing de novo the determination 
of law); Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 398 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding 
that “we need not defer to any reasonable interpretation of the Commissioner”). 
39 See, e.g., Wm. Redin Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem 
of Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 950, 950 (1942) (noting that the courts have 
failed to treat patents as matters of administrative law). 
40 See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1451 (discussing the original exclusion of patent mat-
ters from the scope of the APA); see also George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The 
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1618-
19 tbl.1 (1996) (discussing the history of the passage of the APA and listing the PTO as 
an agency exempted under the Walter-Logan Bill). 
41 Zurko, 527 U.S. at 171 & n.* (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
42 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 395 (1948) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”). 
43 These standards are drawn from 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006), which codifies sec-
tion 10(e) of the APA.  It states in relevant part the following: 
The reviewing court shall—  
 . . . . 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be— 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
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In Zurko, a disappointed patent applicant appealed the PTO’s de-
nial of her patent application to the Federal Circuit, challenging the 
PTO’s understanding of the prior art as clearly erroneous.44  The Fed-
eral Circuit agreed, reversing the PTO’s decision and applying the 
traditional “clearly erroneous” standard of review to the PTO’s factual 
findings.45  The PTO petitioned for a rehearing en banc on the 
ground that the Federal Circuit should have applied an APA-level 
standard of deference, which the PTO maintained would have caused 
the Federal Circuit to affirm the PTO’s decision.  Noting that “[t]he 
[PTO] Commissioner has campaigned aggressively” for the PTO to be 
granted greater deference, upon rehearing the Federal Circuit 
unanimously held that the APA’s standards of review did not apply 
when the Federal Circuit reviews the PTO’s findings of fact in direct 
appeals from the PTO.46
In a somewhat fractured reversal of the Federal Circuit, the Su-
preme Court held that the APA applied to the court’s review of PTO 
findings of fact.47  The Court came out against anti–PTO exceptional-
ism, requiring that PTO decisions be treated the same as other agency 
rulings and stressing “the importance of maintaining a uniform ap-
proach to judicial review of administrative action.”48  The Court left 
open the question of precisely which APA standard to apply, however, 
confining itself to the question of whether the APA applied at all.49
Subsequent to Zurko, the Federal Circuit has chosen the “substantial 
evidence” standard.50  If one is of a cynical cast of mind, this result 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to [either the 
rulemaking or adjudication provisions of the APA] or otherwise reviewed 
on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial 
de novo by the reviewing court. 
Id.
44 In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1997), rev’d en banc, 142 F.3d 1447 
(Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
45 Id. at 889. 
46 In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1449. 
47 Zurko, 527 U.S. at 152. 
48 Id. at 154; see also id. at 165 (stating that the Federal Circuit and supporting 
amici failed to explain “convincingly why direct review of the PTO’s patent denials 
demands a stricter fact-related review standard than is applicable to other agencies”). 
49 Id. at 158. 
50 See, e.g., In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (concluding that 
“‘substantial evidence’ review applies when the reviewing court must confine its review 
of agency factfinding to the record produced by the agency proceeding”). 
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should not be surprising.  The “substantial evidence” standard is gen-
erally considered slightly less deferential than arbitrary and capricious 
review, primarily because substantial evidence review applies to formal 
agency proceedings and requires the agency to put its reasoning in 
the record.51  The Federal Circuit perhaps saw the case as a zero-sum 
game between itself and the PTO.  This would not be unusual; appel-
late courts are sensitive to the boundaries of power between courts 
and agencies and, given the choice, are loath to concede ground to 
the latter.52
Orin Kerr has called Zurko’s pondering of the level of deference to 
give to the PTO’s factual findings “a question with more symbolic than 
practical importance,” the results of which are not “likely to have a 
significant impact on the functioning of the patent system.”53  While it 
is true that the number of cases affected by the difference is small—as 
the Supreme Court in Zurko itself noted, the functional difference be-
tween an “unsupported by substantial evidence” standard and a 
“clearly erroneous” standard is vanishingly small54—the symbolic im-
portance of Zurko looms large.  Zurko taught the PTO and the Federal 
Circuit alike that the PTO could take on the Federal Circuit and win.  
The PTO’s en banc request to the Federal Circuit, its petition for cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court, and its resulting victory heralded the 
first of several changes of fortune for the PTO.  Zurko morphed from a 
run-of-the-mill appeal of a patent denial by the PTO into the first ma-
jor PTO win in the legal battle to increase its influence vis-à-vis the 
Federal Circuit.  Indeed, in its opinion, the Supreme Court perhaps 
unwittingly picked up on this dynamic, addressing (and chiding) the 
51 See Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 
(1983) (indicating that the “substantial evidence” standard is more rigorous than the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard).  In writing the majority opinion in Zurko, however, 
Justice Breyer indicated that the two standards were similar.  See 527 U.S. at 158 (citing 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984), for the proposition that 
there is “no difference between the APA’s ‘arbitrary, capricious’ standard and its ‘sub-
stantial evidence’ standard as applied to court review of agency factfinding”). 
52 See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station:  An Empirical 
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1027 & n.114 (discussing appel-
late courts’ resistance to applying deferential review standards to agency decisions). 
53 Kerr, supra note 5, at 168. 
54 See 527 U.S. at 162-63 (noting that the difference between the “clearly errone-
ous” standard and the “unsupported by substantial evidence” standard is “so fine that 
(apart from the present case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a 
reviewing court conceded that use of one standard rather than the other would in fact 
have produced a different outcome”). 
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Federal Circuit as if the court and its supporters, rather than Mary 
Zurko, were parties to the case.55
3.  The Scope of Rulemaking Authority 
After the PTO received heightened deference in Zurko for its fac-
tual findings, the next logical step for it was to seek to solidify and ex-
pand the scope of its rulemaking authority.  First the PTO presented 
its case before Congress.  In 2007, the PTO thanked Congress for 
proposing legislation, the Patent Reform Act of 2007,56 that would 
grant it the power “to promulgate such rules, regulations and orders 
that the Director determines appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
Title 35 or any other applicable law,” arguing that it “has long be-
lieved that rulemaking authority is beneficial to the patent system.”57
Despite passing the House of Representatives, the proposed legisla-
tion ultimately failed to be enacted, but the PTO has not given up. 
The latest incarnation of the debate over the proper scope of PTO 
rulemaking power involves the question of when patent rules are sub-
stantive and when they are procedural.  The PTO has regulatory au-
thority to enact rules governing “the conduct of [its internal] pro-
ceedings,”58 but the line between establishing procedural rules and 
engaging in substantive legal determinations is not always clear.  In 
August 2007, after a notice and comment period, the PTO announced 
a set of final rules59 that it claimed would help streamline the patent 
approval process and improve its ability to examine patent applica-
tions.60  Among other things, the rules limited the ability of a patent 
55 See, e.g., id. at 154 (“The Federal Circuit rests its claim for an exception upon 
§ 559.”); id. at 164 (“Second, the [Federal] Circuit and its supporting amici believe that 
a change to APA review standards will create an anomaly.”); id. at 165 (“Finally, the 
[Federal] Circuit reasons that its stricter court/court review will produce better agency 
factfinding.”).
56 See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007). 
57 See Letter from John J. Sullivan, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to the 
Honorable Howard L. Berman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Prop., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives 9 (May 16, 
2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sullivan Letter] (presenting the views of the 
Department of Commerce and the PTO on H.R. 1908, the proposed Patent Reform 
Act of 2007). 
58 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
59 Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications 
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applica-
tions, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1 (2008)). 
60 See id. at 46,716 (explaining that the “changes will mean more effective and effi-
cient examination for the typical applicant”). 
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applicant to file continuation or continuation-in-part applications,61
limited the number of claims that could be included in a patent appli-
cation,62 and increased the burdens on applicants to disclose informa-
tion about the invention.63  Both sets of rules were to be retroactive.64
The proposed rules were challenged by parties claiming that the rules 
were “unlawful agency action under subsection 706(2) of the APA”65
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
which found that the new rules exceeded the PTO’s rulemaking authority.66
Upon appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled in Tafas v. Doll that the 
PTO had the authority to establish regulations that “govern the con-
duct of proceedings in the office,” that “facilitate and expedite the 
processing of patent applications,” and that “govern the recognition 
and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing appli-
cants or other parties” before it.67  Within these boundaries, the court 
stated that it would grant Chevron deference to the PTO’s “interpreta-
tion of statutory provisions that relate to the exercise of delegated au-
thority.”68  The Federal Circuit, however, agreed with the district court 
that the patent statute “does not vest the USPTO with any general 
61 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(1)(i)–(iii) (permitting an applicant, as a matter of right, 
to file two continuation or continuation-in-part applications, plus a single request for 
continued examination (RCE), after an initial application); id. § 1.114(f) (stating the 
conditions under which a petition is not necessary to request continued examination).  
If the applicant wanted to continue engaging in prosecution of the application, the 
applicant would have to petition to do so.  See id. § 1.78(d)(1)(vi) (“A petition must be 
filed in such nonprovisional application that is accompanied by the fee set forth in 
§ 1.17(f) and a showing that the amendment, argument, or evidence sought to be en-
tered could not have been submitted during the prosecution of the prior-filed applica-
tion.”); id. § 1.114(g) (requiring that the petition show why the “amendment, argu-
ment, or evidence . . . could not have been submitted prior to the close of prosecution 
in the application”). 
62 See id. § 1.75(b)(1) (permitting an applicant to present a maximum of five in-
dependent claims or twenty-five total claims for examination unless additional infor-
mation is filed). 
63 See id. (requiring an applicant who wants to exceed the limitations to submit an 
“examination support document”). 
64 See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications 
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applica-
tions, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,716-17 (breaking down the applicability dates by section). 
65 Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (E.D. Va. 2008), vacated in part sub nom.
Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
66 Id. at 817. 
67 559 F.3d at 1351-52 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2006)). 
68 Id. at 1354. 
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substantive rulemaking power,”69 stating that such a principle was 
“amply supported by our precedent.”70
To determine whether the Final Rules were substantive or proce-
dural, the Federal Circuit chose to follow JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.71
In JEM, the D.C. Circuit found new rules to be procedural because 
they did not “foreclose effective opportunity to make one’s case on 
the merits.”72  Under the JEM framework, the Federal Circuit con-
cluded, the PTO’s Final Rules did not “‘foreclose effective opportu-
nity’ to present patent applications for examination”—they only re-
quired applicants to exert more efforts to comply.73  Although it found 
the Final Rules in Tafas to be procedural, the Federal Circuit left the 
door open for future challenges to PTO-proposed rules, stating that 
“an agency’s determination of the scope of its own authority is not en-
titled to Chevron deference.”74
The PTO spun the outcome in Tafas as a victory, stating that it was 
“pleased that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit confirmed that the Final Rules are within the agency’s rulemak-
ing authority and that the rules regarding requests for continued ex-
amination, claims, and examination support documents are consistent 
with the law.”75
Tafas represents an expansion in power for the PTO in some ways, 
but the result is not as favorable as the PTO wanted.  Most obviously, 
one of the four rules proposed by the PTO was struck down by the 
Federal Circuit, even though it was procedural, because it “at-
tempt[ed] to add an additional requirement [for filing third and sub-
sequent continuation applications]—that the application not contain 
amendments, arguments, or evidence that could have been submitted 
earlier—that is foreclosed by the statute.”76  Despite being urged by 
the PTO and several amici to give the PTO deference on its interpre-
tation of the statute, the Federal Circuit declined to do so.  More sub-
69 Id. at 1352 (quoting Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 811). 
70 Id.
71 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
72 Id. at 327-28 (quoting Lamoille Valley R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce 
Comm’n, 711 F.2d 295, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
73 Tafas, 559 F.3d  at 1356 (quoting JEM, 22 F.3d at 328). 
74 Id. at 1353. 
75 See Paul Devinsky & Nathaniel McQueen, Tafas v. Doll: Patent Rules Given New 
Life by Federal Circuit, MONDAQ, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp? 
articleid=76908 (quoting a PTO press release). 
76 Tafas, 559 F.3d  at 1360. 
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tly, the framework used by the Federal Circuit to determine whether 
future PTO-proposed rules are procedural or substantive continues to 
allow the court to oversee the PTO.  By announcing that the PTO did 
not have the ability to determine the scope of its own authority—a 
view about which the Federal Circuit admitted that “the majority of 
the Supreme Court has not yet spoken”—the court left the door open 
for future refusals to grant deference to PTO rulemaking.77  In the 
long run, the significance of the PTO’s gains under Tafas, like those 
under Zurko, may be more symbolic than substantive. 
Some commentators have advocated in favor of expanding the 
scope of PTO rulemaking authority, proposing that the Federal Cir-
cuit ought to review the PTO’s interpretations of the Patent Act using 
the framework set forth in Chevron for questions of law and mixed 
questions of law and fact.78  Under a broad reading of Chevron, the 
PTO would assume the primary responsibility for interpreting the 
Patent Act when the statutory term at issue is ambiguous or the Act is 
silent regarding its meaning—an interpretive role traditionally re-
served for the Federal Circuit as an Article III court.79  This would, at 
least in theory, constitute a shift in power from the Federal Circuit to 
the PTO.  Whether this would actually constitute a shift in power is a 
different matter.80
Many of the most important provisions of the Patent Act are 
fraught with textual ambiguity.  Words such as “nonobvious,” “used,” 
“process”—and for the epistemologically minded, “known”—appear 
77 Id. at 1353. 
78 See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
1415, 1423 (1995) (arguing for heightened deference on the part of the Federal Cir-
cuit to the PTO to produce an “optimal balance of interpretive power”); Arti Rai, Ad-
dressing the Patent Gold Rush:  The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 199, 221-26 (2000) (promoting application of the Chevron standard to the “cen-
tral patentability question of nonobviousness”). 
79 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984) (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and 
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”). 
80 Some commentators think that Chevron’s impact is not all it has been cracked 
up to be.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Defer-
ence:  Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (”[W]e conclude there has not been a Chevron ‘revolu-
tion’ at the Supreme Court level.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 990 (1992) (arguing that the impact of Chevron has been 
overstated and that “post-Chevron decisions explicating the meaning of Chevron reveal 
much that calls into question the Court’s fidelity to the doctrine”). 
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throughout the Patent Act.81  Congress quite notably spoke directly to 
few questions of patent law when it wrote the Patent Act in 1952.82  In 
the absence of such direction, Chevron would give the PTO potentially 
broad power to interpret the Patent Act.83  For example, the PTO 
could raise or lower the threshold at which an invention is declared 
obvious by altering its definition of the word “obvious” or by redefin-
ing the word “process” to declare subject matter off limits. 
Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit has resisted this notion, not 
just in Tafas but elsewhere, commenting that the PTO “does not earn 
Chevron deference on questions of substantive patent law.”84  As the 
court has explained, “the broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking pow-
ers . . . authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations di-
rected only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does 
NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules,” 
and since “Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any gen-
eral substantive rulemaking power . . . . the rule of controlling defer-
ence set forth in Chevron does not apply.”85  Such resistance on the 
part of the Federal Circuit to applying Chevron to PTO patent deci-
sions does not apply to other administrative bodies—including the 
trademark side of the PTO—that come before the court.86  As Craig 
Nard notes, Federal Circuit panel majorities have not just cited Chev-
ron but have applied it to many other adjudicative bodies, including 
the International Trade Commission, the Merit Systems Protection 
Board, the Court of Federal Claims, the Board of Contract Appeals, 
the Court of Veterans Appeals, and the International Trade Admini-
stration.87
81 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country . . . .”); id. § 103(b)(1) 
(providing the circumstances under which “a biotechnological process . . . shall be 
considered nonobvious”). 
82 Giles S. Rich and Pat Federico were the actual drafters of the Patent Act.  See
Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came To Be, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 181, 181-82 (2004). 
83 See 467 U.S. at 843 (asserting that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute”). 
84 Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
85 Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Animal 
Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
86 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 
F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying the Chevron test to the PTO’s construc-
tion of the Lanham Act). 
87 Nard, supra note 78, at 1432-33. 
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B.  Funding 
The PTO has not just been active in the legal arena in its attempts 
to expand its influence.  It has also been working hard on the finan-
cial and public relations fronts to gain more control over, and ex-
pand, its budget.  We should not be surprised that the PTO would be 
trying to expand its budget:  funding is important to the life and in-
fluence of any agency.88  We don’t often think of regulatory institu-
tions as appealing to their constituencies—indeed, agency entangle-
ment with the community it is supposed to regulate is usually 
portrayed in the literature as being more of a demand-side initiative—
but inviting capture is precisely what the PTO did in the 1990s, taking 
its appeals directly to the regulated community.89
After a series of legislative provisions throughout the 1990s al-
lowed Congress to use the PTO as a revenue generator, one of the 
top-priority items for the PTO became gaining more control over its 
budget.  In 1990, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act (OBRA),90 which, among other things, required the PTO to 
fund its operations through fees that it collected from its users.91  In 
addition, from fiscal year (FY) 1991 to FY 1999,92 OBRA imposed a 
sixty-nine percent surcharge on top of both patent application and is-
suance fees.93  Fees collected from users were “available [to the PTO] 
until expended,” whereas surcharge revenue was not.94  As a result, the 
88 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOV-
ERNMENT 81 (1971) (hypothesizing that agencies attempt to maximize the size of their 
budgets). 
89 Let me reiterate that the PTO is not truly a regulatory institution in the sense 
that the EPA, for example, is a regulatory institution.  See Kerr, supra note 5 and ac-
companying text. 
90 Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). 
91 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-382, at 7-8 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1320, 1322-23 (noting the drastic fee increase imposed by OBRA); H.R. REP. NO. 101-
881, at 159 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2167 (“The purpose of this title 
is to make the Patent and Trademark Office self-sufficient by imposing a surcharge on 
user fees . . . .”).  An exception is PTO employee benefits, which are administered by 
the Office of Personnel Management.  See H.R. REP. NO. 101-881, at 162 (1990), re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2170 (noting that fees will be credited to PTO sala-
ries and expense accounts). 
92 The federal government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30.  Fiscal 
year 2001, for example, covers the period from October 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001. 
93 § 10101(a), 104 Stat. at 1388-391 (codified at 35 U.S.C. 41 note (2006)). 
94 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 69.  
Starting in FY 1992, Congress withheld surcharge revenue from PTO appropriations 
and used that revenue for other programs. 
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PTO became entirely self-funded, with Congress taking its cut of the 
money that the PTO raised. 
In 1993, the year Bruce Lehman became Commissioner of the 
PTO, the Office began sending glossy informational brochures about 
itself to patent prosecutors, law firms, and firms in the technological 
community.95  The first such publication was given the rather dull title 
of  “Annual Report,” but the brochures quickly became more overtly 
promotional.  Starting the following year, the brochures began refer-
ring to inventors as “customers.”96  They stated that the PTO’s mission 
was to “help our customers get patents”97 and to “ensure strong intel-
lectual property protection for all Americans.”98  The PTO announced 
that it could serve its “customers” better if only it had a bigger budget, 
more office space, more control over its internal operations, executive 
branch agency status, and other items it identified on its wish list.99  At 
the same time, the PTO declared that one of its goals was to come to 
“play a leadership role in intellectual property rights policy”100 and to 
achieve “greater partnering with industry.”101
The Washington, D.C. policy community took notice quickly.  
Previously, the PTO had been an unfashionable backwater, a bureau 
of the Department of Commerce that was perpetually underfunded, 
95 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE AND 
COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS: ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1993 
[hereinafter 1993 REPORT].
96 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS: A PAT-
ENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 1994 passim [hereinafter 1994 REPORT]. 
97 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW:
CREATING A PATENT AND TRADEMARK SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, FISCAL YEAR 
1997, at 8 [hereinafter 1997 REPORT].
98 1994 REPORT, supra note 96, at 1.  One wonders about non-U.S. residents, who 
at that time filed almost half of all patent applications.  See id. at 63 tbl.2, 67 tbl.11 
(showing that non-U.S. residents filed 83,920 out of 201,554 patent applications, or 
41.6%, in 1994); see also 1997 REPORT, supra note 97, at 85, 89 (showing that non-U.S. 
residents filed 102,249 out of 237,045 patent applications, or 43.1%, in 1997). 
99 See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SETTING THE COURSE FOR OUR FU-
TURE: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 1995, at 36 [hereinafter 
1995 REPORT] (listing “long-term space needs, restrictions in the number of PTO em-
ployees, and continued diversion of funds by Congress” as “critical areas for financial 
and management improvement”). 
100 1997 REPORT, supra note 97, at 6; 1995 REPORT, supra note 99, at 5, 11-12; see 
also 1994 REPORT, supra note 96, at 1 (“[T]he PTO seeks to play a leadership role in . . . 
develop[ing] . . . strong intellectual property protection.”). 
101 See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, IDEAS THAT BECOME VALUABLE IN-
NOVATIONS: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 1998, http://
www.uspto.gov/go/com/annual/1998/a98r-toc.htm/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (fol-
low “Patents” or follow “Innovators and Innovations”). 
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understaffed, and overlooked.  That began to change.  As early as 
1994, The National Law Journal named Lehman “Lawyer of the Year,” 
stating that he “has brought his job—and U.S. intellectual property 
policy—to an unprecedented level of importance.”102
The PTO’s financial position steadily improved as various interest 
groups began to take up the cause of the PTO.  Figure 1 shows the 
amounts of PTO funding, along with PTO’s workload, from 1976 on-
ward.  As can be seen from the figure, the increase in the PTO’s an-
nual budget allocation has steadily outstripped the increase in the 
number of patents filed and has greatly outstripped the increase in 
the number of patents issued.103  Part of this is due to the PTO’s inter-
nal operations becoming more computerized and technologically 
driven.  Even taking this into account, the increase in the budget has 
been notable. 
Funding issues have continued to be a hot-button topic.  The PTO 
has tried to use soft rhetoric in its communications with the inventive 
community.  Rather than call the money it charged patent applicants 
“fees,” the PTO came to refer to them as “Revenues from Sales of 
Goods and Services to the Public,”104 and, later, “Earned Revenue.”105
When the OBRA provisions sunsetted in FY 1999, Congress began lim-
iting the amount of patent fees that the PTO was authorized to spend 
each year,106 a practice referred to by the patent community as “fee di-
version.”  In addition, that same year Congress approved “rescissions” 
of the PTO’s authority to spend some of the patent fees it charged, in-
stead skimming off the revenues and using them to fund other items 
in the federal budget.107  Over the next several years, the inventive 
102 Lawyer of the Year:  Bruce Lehman:  Reinventing the Patent Office, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 
26, 1994 , at C10.  
103 Note that this funding is for the PTO as a whole, including the Trademark Office. 
104 See, e.g., 1995 REPORT, supra note 99, at 50. 
105 See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 50. 
106 See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office Reauthorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-358, sec. 3(b), 112 Stat. 3272, 3273-74 (1998) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2006)). 
107 The rescinded money was used for such purposes as deficit reduction, see Om-
nibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998), subsidies to the steel, coal, and oil industries, see
Emergency Oil and Gas Guaranteed Loan Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106-51, § 202(a), 
113 Stat. 252, 258, appropriations for homeland security programs, see 2002 Supple-
mental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist At-
tacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 1403(a), 116 Stat. 820, 898, and a 
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community came to support the PTO as it advocated hard to end fee 
diversion.108  The combination of the PTO and the inventive commu-
nity lobbying has succeeded in convincing Congress each year since 
2005 to refrain from diverting fees for that year. 
Notable gains to the PTO came not just in the form of an increas-
ing budget, but also in its internal organization and ability to control 
its finances.  In 2000, the PTO became an executive branch agency 
and the position of head of the PTO was elevated from mere commis-
sioner to “Under Secretary of the Department of Commerce for Intel-
lectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office.”109  In 2004, the PTO moved into the new campus built 
for it in Alexandria, Virginia, almost doubling the amount of space al-
located to it relative to its previous location.110  In the 2009 fiscal year, 
the Senate funded the PTO at $2.075 billion.111  For the fourth year in 
a row, the PTO was allowed to keep the money it charged users.112  In 
short, there is nothing on the PTO’s wish list from the mid-1990s that 
it has not received a decade later. 
Much of the credit for these benefits can be laid directly at the 
feet of various interest groups that have lobbied on behalf of increas-
ing the PTO’s budget and ending fee diversion:  the American Bar As-
sociation, the American Intellectual Property Law Association, Am-
gen, the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), the Intellectual 
Property Owners Association (IPO), Microsoft Corporation, the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the National Research 
Council, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to name a few. 
variety of federal programs, e.g., District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-113, app. E § 301(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-303 (1999). 
108 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, PTO Fee Diversion Costs Jobs:  Bar, In-
dustry United Against Diversion (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
intelprop/feediversion.pdf (“All of the major bar association groups in the IP arena, 
and the clients they represent, stand united:  PTO fee diversion must come to an end.”).
109 See AIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-113, sec. 4713, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-575 (1999) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 3). 
110 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 12 [hereinafter 2004 REPORT].
111 See WILLIAM J. KROUSE & EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RES. SERV., CRS RE-
PORT FOR CONGRESS, COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE AND RELATED AGENCIES: FY 2009
APPROPRIATIONS 21 (2008), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/ 
08Aug/RL34540.pdf. 
112 See Hatch Draws Attention to PTO Diversion with Amendment, CONGRESSDAILY, Mar. 
17, 2008, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/dj_20080317_9.php. 
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Having proven itself eager “to address issues raised by intellectual 
property stakeholders,”113 the PTO has basked in the appreciation of 
the inventive community.  The PTO has noted that “[o]ur patent cus-
tomers told us:  ‘I am pleased with the customer approach to process-
ing patent applications as opposed to the previous, sometimes adver-
sarial approach.’ [And] ‘[e]xaminers seem flexible and interested in 
working with applicants to allow patentable subject matter to 
grant.’”114  The PTO has declared new subject matter benefiting sec-
tors that supported it to be patent-eligible (thereby also increasing the 
fees it can gather) and established and further solidified internal pro-
cedures that make granting patents, rather than denying them, the 
default rule.115
The PTO has become bolder and bolder over the past decade, to 
the point where it is getting more aggressive and litigious in attempt-
ing to get what it wants.  I predict that the PTO will continue to at-
tempt to increase its market share as a supplier of legal rules.  This 
does not necessarily mean that the PTO will always attempt to 
strengthen patent protection or broaden the scope of patent-eligible 
subject matter, however.  As the PTO itself has recognized, it can get 
support from the inventive community, or at least deflect some criti-
cism, by making the process of getting patents more rigorous.  Some 
commentators have said of the changes to the PTO’s budgetary rules 
and of the PTO’s attempts to become financially self-sufficient:  “It is 
now apparent that these seemingly mundane procedural changes, 
taken together, have resulted in the most profound changes in U.S. 
patent policy and practice since 1836.”116
III. THE UPSHOT
While we often think of agency entanglement with the constitu-
ency it is supposed to regulate as an unalloyed bad, there are some 
113 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2006 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET RE-
QUEST 21 (describing the 21st Century Strategic Plan as “a multi-year plan that identifies 
critical tasks designed to provide the USPTO and external  stakeholders with a long-
term vision of agency goals, potential funding levels, and planned outcomes”). 
114 Q. Todd Dickinson, Commissioner’s Page, PTO TODAY (USPTO), Jan. 2000, at 2, 
5, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/ptotoday/ptotoday01.pdf. 
115 See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System:  A Proposal 
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 324-25 (noting that the method of calculat-
ing disposal of applications and the requirement to indicate reasons for rejections en-
courage examiners to allow patents to issue). 
116 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 12, at 2. 
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benefits that have come out of the PTO’s attempts to increase its in-
fluence.  The PTO’s attempts to appeal to the inventive community 
have resulted in more resources being funneled to the PTO, more air-
time being given to some of the problems that plague the PTO, and 
more rigorous debate about the faults and flaws of the patent system.  
At the same time, there are dangers to the PTO’s expanded power.  In 
this Part, I discuss a few of the benefits and concerns surrounding an 
expanded sphere of influence for the PTO. 
A.  Transparency 
Accusations that the PTO is behaving self-interestedly are nothing 
new.  Within a few years of the PTO’s creation by the Jackson admini-
stration in 1836,117 U.S. Congressman Thomas W. Gilmer accused the 
then-Patent Office, among other entities, of obstructing Congress’s at-
tempts to determine how the Patent Office might reduce its own ex-
penditures.118  What is new is the PTO’s appeal to the inventive com-
munity in its quest to expand its role in the market for influence.119
We can think of the PTO’s annual reports as an attempt to im-
prove rapport with the inventive community.  One of the explicit 
functions of the reports is to demonstrate that the PTO sees itself as 
sympathetic to the concerns of the inventive community.  As the PTO 
itself has said of one of the communications it sent to the patent 
community:  “The 21st Century Strategic Plan is a five-year plan that 
identifies critical tasks designed to provide the USPTO and external 
stakeholders with a long-term vision of agency goals, potential funding 
levels, and planned outcomes.”120  It also described the same docu-
ment as having been created “in order to address issues raised by in-
tellectual property stakeholders.”121  One of the advantages of the pub-
lication of such information is that it functions as a form of 
informative, and not entirely cheap, speech.  The reports transmit in-
117 See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (establishing the Patent Office, the 
predecessor of the PTO). 
118 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”:  Administrative Law from 
Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1669 (2008) (stating that “Congress 
was, as always, suspicious that administrators were wasting government money”). 
119 One of the first discussions of agency capture can be found in MARVER H.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 3-4, 90, 284 (1955).  
Bernstein argued that in the later part of an agency’s life cycle, the agency often be-
comes closely entangled with the industry it is supposed to regulate. 
120 2004 REPORT, supra note 110, at 51. 
121 Id.
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formation about the PTO’s positions on a variety of important patent 
policy, legal, and financial matters.  Much of the information con-
veyed in the reports is subject to external verification.  The PTO has 
become much more forthcoming about information pertaining to its 
internal operations.  As a result, although the PTO started out as an 
experience good, over time it has become more like a search good, at 
least with respect to its policies.122  If the information that the PTO re-
veals is costly speech that is accurate, verifiable, and provides greater 
institutional transparency, this creates a social benefit.  This is the op-
timistic view. 
The less optimistic view is that the PTO could behave strategically 
in the way it presents information to the inventive community, thus 
reducing institutional transparency.  While it is unlikely that the PTO 
would use its communications with the inventive community to make 
outright misstatements of fact, the PTO could use its annual reports to 
draw attention away from policy problems by focusing the discussion 
on issues that redound to its benefit or appear benign.  The PTO has 
already proven itself quite adept at using euphemistic language, such 
as calling user fees “Revenues from Sales of Goods and Services to the 
Public.”123  And although the PTO has modified its rhetoric somewhat 
in recent years, even in 2008 it was still referring to inventors as “cus-
tomers,”124 talking about the “tremendous ingenuity of American in-
ventors,”125 and stating that it desired to “promote still greater collabo-
ration between the USPTO and its customers.”126  Clearly, the PTO is 
concerned about being in the good graces of the inventive commu-
nity, and such a desire creates incentives for the PTO to behave stra-
tegically. 
While much of the information that the PTO reveals in its annual 
reports is verifiable, what is less verifiable is the nature of the informa-
tion that the PTO leaves out of the reports.  For instance, the “count 
system”—the metric used to measure patent examiners’ productivity—
has long been the bane of the PTO’s internal operating procedure 
and a source of bias in the way that the PTO reviews patent applica-
tions.  The PTO’s annual reports give the count system short shrift.  
122 See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312 
(1970) (defining experience goods, search goods, and inspection goods). 
123 See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text. 
124 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 passim [hereinafter 2008 REPORT].
125 Id. at 34. 
126 Id. at 7. 
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Indeed, the PTO has been quite secretive about this weakness for 
many years, an omission that was only partially redressed in a report 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Inspector General.127
Internal PTO practices create a bias in favor of granting patents.  Pat-
ent examiners have quarterly performance quotas that they need to 
meet, each of which gives each examiner a short period of time to re-
view each patent application.128  How much time examiners have to 
review the technology varies according to the “technology center,” or 
technological subdivision, within the PTO, but estimates vary from 
eight to twenty-five hours.129  At different points in the prosecution 
process, examiners have incentives to reject or grant patents in order 
to meet their performance quotas.  Because one of the metrics by 
which examiners are evaluated is the final disposition of patent appli-
cations, examiners have the incentive to grant a patent after two office 
actions (rounds of communication with the patent applicant).130  As a 
result, the count system is an important part of PTO operating proce-
dures.  Because it affects the speed and order in which examiners 
prosecute applications, the intricacies of the count system are a matter 
of interest to the inventive community. 
The PTO might also attempt to manipulate the inventive commu-
nity with the information that it releases, or frame its communications 
in a way that makes the PTO’s positions seem more aligned with the 
interests of the inventive community than they really are.  For in-
stance, while recent reports have been admirably candid about some 
of the quality-control problems facing the PTO, they have shaded the 
nature of the position that the PTO took before Congress regarding 
the scope of its rulemaking authority.  Whereas the PTO told Con-
gress that “rulemaking authority is beneficial to the patent system,” 
that it “welcomes authority that is necessary to promulgate regulations 
to ensure an efficient and quality-based patent examination process,” 
127 See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, USPTO SHOULD 
REASSESS HOW EXAMINER GOALS, PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLANS, AND THE AWARD 
SYSTEM STIMULATE AND REWARD EXAMINER PRODUCTION 7-8 (2004) (noting that indi-
vidual examiner productivity is measured by the number of first office actions and dis-
posals). 
128 See, e.g., id. at 8 (detailing examiners’ two-week production goals). 
129 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 5, at 5 (2003) (providing estimates 
from panelists of the range of time for patent examinations). 
130 See Thomas, supra note 115, at 324-25 (explaining how the docket management 
system has led many to believe that examiners are encouraged to allow patent applica-
tions to issue).
1992 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1965
and that it “thank[s] Congress for suggesting appropriate authority 
for the USPTO,”131 the following year the PTO downplayed its position 
when communicating with the inventive community, saying that it 
merely sought “specific authority to eliminate, set, or otherwise adjust 
patent and trademark filing and processing fees subject to appropriate 
oversight and comment by the Patent Public Advisory Committee, the 
Trademark Public Advisory Committee, stakeholders, and Con-
gress.”132  There is a reason that the PTO has remained quiet about 
this goal before the audience of the inventive community:  expanding 
the PTO’s rulemaking capacity is a divisive issue within the inventive 
community, with vocal opinion running against it.133  Unlike requests 
that the PTO has made in the past for the inventive community to 
support it in matters like executive branch agency status or an end to 
fee diversion, the PTO is unlikely to bring the inventive community around 
to its point of view on the matter of legal deference any time soon. 
B.  Capture and Institutional Bias 
The PTO’s attempts to woo the inventive community present the 
obvious danger of the PTO being captured by the very group that it is 
supposed to regulate.  The PTO’s legal and budgetary gains, coupled 
with its desire to stay in the inventive community’s good graces, make 
it an attractive target for capture.  From the perspective of patent ap-
plicants, even a small amount of influence over the process by which 
patents are granted could be quite valuable. 
While in theory the likelihood of PTO capture may be high, as 
one would expect from an agency funded entirely by the constituency 
that it regulates, in reality the probability of capture is lower than it 
would at first appear.  Several factors reduce the possibility of capture.  
First, the major interest groups with something at stake in patent 
law—the pharmaceutical industry and the software industry—have 
131 Sullivan Letter, supra note 57, at 9. 
132 2008 REPORT, supra note 124, at 34. 
133 Amicus briefs in Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), ran thirteen-to-
two against the PTO.  The amicus briefs in support of Tafas were filed by the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association; the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO); 
Cantor Fitzgerald Patent Holdings (CFPH); Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Intellectual 
Ventures, et al.; the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO); Robert Lelkes; 
Licensing Professionals; Monsanto; the New York Intellectual Property Law Association 
(NYIPLA); the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA); 
SonicWALL et al.; and the William Mitchell College of Law Intellectual Property Insti-
tute.  The two briefs in support of the PTO were filed by Intellectual Property and 
Administrative Law Professors and by the Public Patent Foundation et al. 
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generally proven to be well-organized and balanced on opposite sides 
of many key issues in patent law and policy.134  This makes capture of 
the PTO by one industry or interest group less likely.  Second, the in-
ventive community has not been particularly interested in capturing 
the agency. 
Interest groups have generally been more supportive of the PTO 
before Congress on financial matters than on legal matters.  Perhaps 
this is because the PTO has appealed to the inventive community 
much more often, and more passionately, for support on issues re-
garding financial resources and physical plant needs.  Only rarely, 
such as when it wanted to be elevated to executive agency status, has 
the PTO taken its case to the inventive community on legal matters.  
But the types of issues on which the inventive community chooses to 
support the PTO are likely determined more by the inventive com-
munity itself than by the PTO.  Perhaps the inventive community pre-
fers to support the PTO on financial matters because it distrusts the 
PTO’s judgment on legal issues and sees its support on financial mat-
ters as a way of keeping the PTO on a short leash.  The types of issues 
on which the inventive community has consistently supported the 
PTO tend to be ephemeral, requiring the PTO to go back to Congress 
periodically, rather than ones that would give the PTO permanent 
benefits.  If the inventive community refrains from supporting expan-
sions of PTO power because it distrusts the PTO’s judgment, and if 
the support of the inventive community is necessary for the PTO to 
get what it wants from Congress, then the inventive community is act-
ing as a check on PTO power.  But if the inventive community refrains 
from supporting the PTO on issues that would expand the PTO’s 
power permanently in order to keep the PTO beholden to it, that in-
creases the danger of capture. 
The social costs of PTO capture, if it occurred, would likely be 
smaller than they appear at first blush. The PTO’s reach is limited, as 
it doesn’t have regulatory authority over the inventive community in 
the same way that the Food and Drug Administration can regulate 
pharmaceutical products or the Environmental Protection Agency can 
regulate pollution-emission activities.135  The PTO does not regulate 
the ongoing use of inventions after a patent is granted.  This lessens 
concerns about the degree to which industry influence over the PTO 
134 See Clarisa Long, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law (Nov. 
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
135 See Kerr, supra note 5 (arguing that the PTO is not a regulatory agency). 
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would create social harms.136  Nevertheless, the power to grant patents 
is an important one, and distortions caused by interest-group influ-
ence over the process of examining patents can still cause social harm.  
Allowing a patent to issue when it should not (a Type I error), as well 
as denying a patent on an invention that meets all the legal require-
ments for a patent (a Type II error), can have long-term effects on inno-
vation and the development of technology, especially in infant industries. 
Issues of capture aside, there are other concerns about the PTO 
gaining a larger share of the market for legal influence in patent law.  
One concern is the potential for PTO bias against certain parties or 
inventions.  The PTO has not attempted to appeal to all applicants 
equally in its annual reports.  Instead, it has focused on inventors who 
are U.S. citizens, promising to “ensure strong intellectual property 
protection for all Americans”137 and reporting that it has “worked to 
foster innovation among America’s next generation.”138  Describing 
itself as “The World’s Best Patent Office,” the PTO has announced 
that it “educates others about intellectual property protection,” in-
cluding foreign governments.139  Residents of foreign countries filed 
47.1% of all patent applications in 2007, but perhaps unsurprisingly, 
this is a constituency that the PTO has not attempted to woo.140
In addition to bias in favor of some applicants, the PTO has an in-
centive to favor patentees over nonpatentees, although both groups 
have an interest in making sure that the patent system functions well.  
This is not surprising; nonpatentees are not a constituency of the 
PTO.  At the level of substantive patent policy, the PTO’s budgetary 
structure creates a bias in favor of granting patents and encouraging 
inventors to apply for patents.  It also creates the incentive for the 
PTO to favor patentees (who pay fees to the PTO) over nonpatentees 
(who do not).  The size of the PTO’s budget is a function of the filing 
and maintenance fees that the PTO receives.  By reminding its “cus-
tomers” that it wants to help them get patents, the PTO encourages 
136 See G. Dosi et al., How Much Should Society Fuel the Greed of Innovators? On the Rela-
tions Between Appropriability, Opportunities and Rates of Innovation, 35 RES. POL’Y 1110, 
1115 (2006) (discussing regulatory capture in heavily regulated industries where inno-
vation is strongly tied to intellectual property rights); see also Michele Boldrin & David 
K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
1252, 1255 (2005) (discussing the effect of “monopoly creep” on regulatory agencies). 
137 1994 REPORT, supra note 96, at 1. 
138 2007 REPORT, supra note 22, at 3. 
139 2005 REPORT, supra note 22, at 3-4. 
140 See 2008 REPORT, supra note 124, at 116 tbl.2, 122 tbl.9 (showing that, in 2007, 
residents of foreign countries filed 220,432 out of 468,330 applications). 
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inventors to submit more applications, which results in more revenue 
from filing fees.  Granting more patents yields more maintenance 
fees.  This is yet one more factor undercutting the traditional adver-
sarial relationship that the PTO is supposed to have with patent appli-
cants.
For its part, the PTO stands to benefit from continuing to seek 
control over more resources.  A strategy of appealing to the inventive 
community for support does not require the PTO to share the result-
ing legal or financial gains with other institutions.  The probability of 
free-riding by other institutions will be low, since the PTO’s gains—
whether budgetary or legal—are specific to the PTO.  Nor does the 
PTO face the problem of geographical dispersion, which would raise 
the costs of coordination and organization.141  With Congress out of 
the picture, the PTO faces no oppositional institution in the area of 
patent prosecution other than the Federal Circuit.  A fairly robust 
(and completely intuitive) finding in the empirical literature is that 
interest groups fare better if they face no countervailing forces in the 
political arena.142  With these incentives, we can expect the PTO to 
continue to attempt to gain more influence and resources in the mar-
ket for patent policy and to appeal to the inventive community for 
support.
CONCLUSION
The PTO’s attempts to increase its influence have been waged on 
two fronts:  First, the gains that it has made in the legal arena may not 
have had a large substantive effect, but they have had significant sym-
bolic value.  Second, the gains that the PTO has made by appealing 
directly to the inventive community have been more powerful.  When 
the inventive community has taken the PTO’s side before Congress, 
the results have been impressive.  While appeals by an agency to its 
constituency for support are unusual and present obvious dangers of 
141 See J. Snyder, Political Geography and Interest-Group Power, 6 SOC. CHOICE & WEL-
FARE 103, 105 (1989) (suggesting that geography can raise the costs of organizing but 
can also bring more resources under an entity’s control). 
142 See, e.g., Michel Boucher, Rent-Seeking and the Behavior of Regulators:  An Empirical 
Analysis, 69 PUB. CHOICE 51, 65 (1991) (explaining that large trucking firms were more 
successful in Quebec because of their political effectiveness and better relationship 
with political regulators); Paul Teske, Interests and Institutions in State Regulation, 35 
AMER. J. POL. SCI. 139, 151 (1991) (finding that the existence of a state-funded con-
sumer advocacy group reduces the political effectiveness of telecommunication com-
panies’ lobbying efforts). 
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capture and opportunities for bargaining on the part of the regulated 
community, in the case of the PTO there have been positive benefits.  
The PTO has become more transparent as part of the tacit bargain 
that it is attempting to strike with the inventive community.  At the 
same time, however, the PTO has the incentive to be strategic with the 
information that it reveals so as to present its case in the best light.  
For its part, the inventive community may function as a check on the 
PTO, or it may end up enabling the PTO to gain a larger share of the 
market for influence in patent law.  How this ongoing relationship will 
continue to develop remains to be seen. 
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APPENDIX
Figure 1:  PTO Funding vs. Backlog, New Filings, and  
Patents Issued (1976–Present)143
143 A detailed breakdown of these data appears in Table 1. 
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Table 1:  United States Patent and Trademark Office  
Funding Levels, 1976–2009 
Year 
(Director)
PTO Budget 
(millions)144
Surcharge 
(millions)145
Patent  
Applications 
Filed146
Patents 
Granted Backlog147
1976 $25 0 109,227 80,735 142,379 
1977 $25 0 109,773 72,832 144,542 
1978 $25 0 108,744 70,320 144,056 
1979 $25 0 107,409 55,418 151,702 
1980 $25 0 112,215 61,227 167,533 
1981 $25 0 114,710 71,010 181,727 
1982 $25 0 124,800 65,152 216,509 
1983    $162.42148 0 105,704 59,715 223,101 
1984 $193.47 0 117,985 72,149 219,567 
1985 $209.69 0 125,931 75,302 215,512 
1986 $227.89 0 131,403 76,993 207,774 
1987 $260.95 0 137,173 88,793 209,911 
1988 $305.02 0 148,183 83,584 215,280 
1989 $335.77 0 163,306 102,712 222,755 
1990 $344.70 0 174,711 96,727 244,964 
1991 $370.63 $99.3 178,083 101,860 254,507 
1992 $435.91 $95 185,446 109,728 269,596 
1993 (Lehman) $502.37 $99 188,099 107,332 244,646 
1994 (Lehman)    $529.02149 $103 201,554 113,268 261,249 
1995 (Lehman) $581.17 $107 236,679 114,241 298,522 
1996 (Lehman)    $592.50150 $111 206,276 116,875 303,720 
144 The PTO approximated its budget for 1976 to 1982 inclusive using its 1993 
Annual Report.  See 1993 REPORT, supra note 95, at 37 fig.12. 
145 See Public Budget Database Fiscal Year 2009, Budget Authority Table, Row 594, 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/sheets/budauth.xls  (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
146 For data on patent applications filed, patents granted, and backlog, see the An-
nual Reports of the PTO for each year from 1993 to 2008.  USPTO Annual Reports, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
147 The PTO calls its backlog “Patent Applications Pending Prior to Allowance.”  
They include utility, design, plant, and reissue applications. 
148 For PTO budget data for years 1983 to 1993 inclusive, see 1993 REPORT, supra
note 95, at 49 tbl.2.  For budget years 1983 to 1990 inclusive, the PTO’s total funding 
for a given year came from five sources:  Appropriations from the General Fund, Off-
setting Fee Collections, Unobligated Balances from the Prior Year, Federal Reim-
bursements, and Recovery of Prior Year Obligations. 
149 For PTO budget data for years 1994 to 1995 inclusive, see 1995 REPORT, supra
note 99, at 50. 
150  For PTO budget data for years 1996 to 1997 inclusive, see 1997 REPORT, supra
note 97, at 50. 
2009] The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law 1999
Year 
(Director)
PTO Budget 
(millions)
Surcharge 
(millions)
Patent  
Applications 
Filed
Patents 
Granted Backlog
1997 (Lehman) $702.43 $115 237,045 122,977 373,904 
1998 (Dickinson)    $691.00151 $119 256,666 154,579 379,484 
1999 (Dickinson)    $643.03152 0 278,268 159,166 414,837 
2000 (Dickinson)    $755.00153 0 311,807 182,223 485,129 
2001 (Godici)    $783.84154 0 344,717 187,822 542,007 
2002 (Rogan)    $843.70155 0 353,394 177,317 636,530 
2003 (Rogan)    $1,015.23156 0 355,418 189,590 674,691 
2004 (Dudas)    $1,235.70157 0 378,984 187,170 756,604 
2005 (Dudas) $1,514.10 0 409,532 165,483 885,002 
2006 (Dudas) $1,680.10 0 445,613 183,187 1,036,588 
2007 (Dudas) $1,794.50 0 468,330 184,377 1,112,517 
2008 (Dudas)    $1,916.00158 0 495,095 182,556 1,276,028 
2009    $2,075.00159 – – – –
151 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2475 (1997).  
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 caused the PTO to become essen-
tially fully user-fee funded by 1991.  See Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388, 
1388-391 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 41 note(2006)).  By 1993, the PTO did not receive 
any appropriations from the general revenue.  During this period, Congress instituted 
a fee surcharge, of which it only appropriated a portion to the PTO. 
152 See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-82 (1998).  In 1999, Congress passed 
the American Inventors Protection Act and began a policy of diverting patent fees.  See
discussion supra note 6.  Congress accepted all of the PTO’s collected fees into the gen-
eral fund, but only returned part of that amount to the PTO in its appropriations bills. 
153 See Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-23, 1501A-28 (1999). 
154 See Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762A-69, 2762-A73 to -A74 (2000). 
155 See Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 769, 773 (2001).  In 2002, Congress passed the Intellec-
tual Property and High Technology Technical Amendments Act of 2002, which among 
other things “authorized to be appropriated to the [PTO between 2003 and 2008] an 
amount equal to the fees estimated . . . to be collected in each such fiscal year, respec-
tively.”  See Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13102, 116 Stat. 1899, 1899 (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 42 note). 
156 See Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 72 (2003). 
157 For PTO budget data for years 2004 to 2007 inclusive, see 2007 REPORT, supra
note 22, at 51 fig. 
158 2008 REPORT, supra note 124, at 54 fig. 
159 See KROUSE & MURPHY, supra note 111, at 21. 
